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6. Female suicide bombers and autonomy 
Herjeet Marway 
Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to consider which theoretical understandings of autonomy 
are useful and appropriate for interpreting real-life violent women and for attributing 
them with autonomy where this might be fitting. I focus on the example of female 
suicide bombers because such women are often denied agency, as I will show. And – 
insofar as our goal in this collection is to recognise agency – if they and their actions 
can be better illuminated on certain philosophical frameworks, then such approaches, 
I argue, are to be preferred. To explore this, I first briefly illustrate the tendency to 
distort the agency of the bombers. I second examine which theoretical models of 
relational autonomy, procedural or substantive, might more fully represent their 
autonomy. I argue that common understandings of female bombers are problematic 
because they are based on societal (patriarchal, oppressive) norms about what women 
should be or can do, and that procedural theories of autonomy less satisfactorily 
capture the social self and degrees of autonomy than substantive notions. Thus, if 
better representations of the autonomy of violent women are being sought, substantive 
relational theories of autonomy should be preferred over procedural ones.  
 
Female suicide bombers 
To start, I briefly present some examples of bombers from differing regions, conflicts, 
and organisations, and I draw attention to how they are portrayed, concentrating on 
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some (I do not claim they are the only) depictions in the West to illustrate dominant 
trends.  
(a) Three examples 
The first example is Muriel Degauque, a 38-year-old Muslim convert originally from 
Charleroi, Belgium. On November 9 2005, she detonated a bomb close to American 
troops and Iraqi police in Baqubah, Iraq. Degauque died in the attack and one 
American soldier sustained minor injuries. She was the first known Caucasian female 
suicide bomber claimed by al-Qaeda and her instructions were believed to be from 
Jordanian militant, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Eager 2008, 171; Skaine 2006, 55-6; 
Cunningham 2008, 95; Zedalis 2008, 59; Browne and Watson 2005; Smith 2005). 
The second example is the double suicide-bombing attack in central Moscow on 
March 29 2010. One attack was by Marium Sharipova, a 28-year old school teacher 
from Balakhani, Dagestan, who detonated her bomb on a commuter train at Lubyanka 
station at 7.56am and killed 27 people in total. The other was by Dzhennet 
Abdullaeva, a 17-year old also from Dagestan, who activated her suicide belt at Park 
Kultury station 40 minutes later and killed 13 people. In addition to the fatalities, 
more than 100 people were injured in both attacks. Doku Umarov, leader of 
Dagestan’s militant Islamist rebels, the Caucasus Emirate, claimed responsibility for 
these attacks soon after.
1
 This was the first attack after the formally declared end to 
Russia’s Counter Terrorist Operation in Chechnya in April 2009 (Harding 2010; BBC 
News 2010; Dzutsev 2010; Frost 2010). Finally, there was an unnamed female suicide 
bomber, who detonated her bomb outside the World Food Programme’s distribution 
                                                             
1 There is, however, some discrepancy over whether it was the Caucasus Emirate who authorised the 
attacks: Shamsudin Batukaev, spokesman for the North Caucasus Emirate, for instance, claimed on March 
31, that they were not involved; a different ‘representative’ on the same day suggested on TV channel First 
Caucasus that it was the Russian security forces instead; whilst footage of Doku Umarov’s claim of 
responsibility was shown on the Kavkaz Center website, though some suggested it appeared dubious. 
(Dzutsev, 2010)  
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centre in Khar, Pakistan on December 26 2010. When stopped for routine security 
checks just outside the centre, she threw 2 hand grenades into a crowd of 300 people 
queuing for aid before activating her suicide belt.
2
 She killed between 43 and 45 
people, and wounded 80 to 102 others. She was the first confirmed female bomber 
claimed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Dawn 2010a, 2010b; Guardian 2010; 
Jerusalem Post 2010).
3
  
(b) Prevalent portrayals 
For reasons discussed elsewhere (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007), female bombers are 
often cast as victims, of either of an oppressive enemy, a ruthless terrorist regime, or 
an ‘uncivilised’ culture (Marway 2011).4 Here, I take these explanations for the 
supposed victimhood of these women and explain how they misrepresent their 
agency.  
There are details in numerous reports that intimate that it is the actions of ‘the enemy’ 
that are the explanation or catalyst for the women’s acts. For instance: that 
Degauque’s “husband […was] shot dead in Iraq by US troops” (BBC 2005) whilst 
preparing for an attack himself, or that Abdullaeva’s “husband […] a leading militant 
in the Russian region of Dagestan […] was killed in a shoot-out with police on New 
Year's Eve” (Shuster 2010). Here the actions of opposing enemy forces (the US or 
Russia) caused the deaths of the women’s loved ones and, in turn, the women’s acts. 
Likewise, as Azam Tariq, spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, claimed of women 
like the unnamed bomber, that she was moved to combat hostile “anti-Taliban forces” 
                                                             
2 Other reports claim she threw her grenades at police and military personnel 
3 There were at least two other cases of suspected female bombers in Pakistan before this, but these were 
not confirmed or claimed by the Pakistani Taliban. The group claimed this attack, but the female nature was 
not commented on explicitly. An attack on 26 June 2011 involving a husband and wife team in Kolachi, 
Pakistan was claimed by them and the sex of the bombers were also highlighted, with Pakistani Taliban 
spokesman, Ahsanullah Ahsan, claiming that the use of a woman “shows how much we hate Pakistani 
security institutions” (Ahsan in Mahsud, 2011) 
4 Elsewhere I have discussed different women and these – as well as other – sorts of explanations for their 
limited agency (Marway 2011). 
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(in Khan 2010), or, as in the Iraq case, that enemy groups bear the responsibility for 
deaths of those “killed or detained by US forces” (Haynes 2008) including partners of 
the female bombers. Those against the Taliban, or the US are blameworthy. 
Differently, the proposition is that, in Dagestan, internal security forces fail to protect 
the people and instead allow “corruption and lawlessness” (Harding 2010, 32) and so 
themselves become the enemy. Together, these responses suggest a reaction to 
occupying forces or to those in power.  
 
In other reports, the women are thought to have become bombers because of actions 
of ‘their side’. For example, it was reported that: a Pakistani girl was “kidnapped, 
strapped with explosives and sent to blow [herself] up”5 (Doherty 2011) by the 
Taliban who are ostensibly fighting against an occupying force for the Afghan people. 
In other organisations, it is suggested that a common tactic is for “a member of al-
Qaeda to marry a woman and then dishonour her in some way, such as letting 
someone else rape her” (Haynes 2008) so she is shamed into “end[ing] her life” as a 
bomber (Shown in ibid). Other reports suggest that the women became accidentally 
embroiled in the world of terrorism through their manipulative partners. That there 
were “secret marriages between rebel commanders and Islamically minded women” 
(Harding 2010, 35) that led to them becoming radicalised, as was suggested with 
Sharipova, or that she was “a lost soul led astray” (Smith, 2005, 1), as was the view 
with Degauque and her involvement with her second husband. These women are 
portrayed as being tricked into becoming bombers. Collectively, then, the idea here is 
that it is the callousness of insurgents themselves that explains the situation.  
                                                             
5 About a young girl reportedly kidnapped by the Pakistani Taliban to become a bomber (Doherty, 2011) 
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A final set of reports suggests these women are victims of ‘their societies’. The 
bomber is portrayed as a “wom[a]n in a position of permanent servitude”6 (Dearing 
2010, 1) and unlikely to be able to decide anything for herself in the case of the 
Taliban. Alternatively, she is deemed a misfit in her society. Degauque is “a runaway 
who dabbled in drugs” (BBC 2005) after her brother’s death and she was failed by 
support structures around her. Differently the Dagestani women are presented as 
“widows of insurgent leaders” (Dzutsev 2010) who, like the Chechen ‘black widows’, 
are presumed to have limited worth after the deaths of their husbands (Groskop 
2004).
7
 In these examples, the women are presented as subordinates or outcasts, and 
their societies drive them to their acts.  
 
While not the only portrayals, the female bombers are presented as ‘victims’ – 
whether at the hands of enemy forces, ruthless insurgents or repressive cultures. As 
victims, however, there is an assumption that they do not have a choice in what they 
do, and this effectively denies them agency (Marway 2011). Either the women are 
non-choosers of violence and forced into the act (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, 50-51; 
West 2004, 7) or considered to be acting for personal reasons alone (West 2004, 7; 
Skaine 2006), for instance. There is the sense that no real choices were made – 
because they are not actors but merely unwilling reactors to enemies, insurgents, or 
societies. As victims, the women’s agency is virtually non-existent.  
 
                                                             
6 About female bombers utilised by the Taliban in Afghanistan (Dearing, 2010) 
7 Viv Groskop’s piece is about the Chechen bombers and culture 
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Yet it is unclear that their agency is as stark as the binary of victim/non-victim 
suggests. This is for at least two connected reasons. First, male bombers are regarded 
as engaging in such practices for a variety of reasons ranging from personal to 
political (though in some cases their agency is denied too – Atran 2004) and it is not 
farfetched to suppose that female bombers would hold comparable reasons. I suggest 
that possible evidence of agency is swept aside too quickly. Second, and linked, the 
severe contexts in which these women are immersed seem to lead to the conclusion 
that they have no agency. To avoid this conclusion – which many theorists who wish 
to recognise agency may want to do – the instinctive reaction is to say they have 
agency regardless of the context. I suggest, however, that contexts cannot wholly 
eliminate agency and decision-making cannot wholly disregard context. Whether 
there is a choice or not, then, does not seem to be the right question or sole indicator 
of agency; rather it is more pertinent to ask about the quality of the decisions being 
made. The women’s agency must be represented in light of broader contextual aspects 
(since decision-making cannot exist outside of these settings), and in terms of the 
mechanics of the decision-making (since women are capable deciders), without any of 
this being reduced to the duality of victim-or-not. In ignoring this combination of 
factors, I argue that these representations deny the bombers proper agency for their 
actions and that better ways in which to conceptualise their agency are required.  
Autonomy 
Discussions about agency in various disciplines often parallel those of autonomy in 
philosophy (Madhok, Phillips, Wilson 2013). Whether someone is autonomous – or 
self-ruling – revolves around the issue of whether the individual does what she 
genuinely wants. Relational models of autonomy are those that endorse a social self 
and consider decision-making within social constraint (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000) 
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and it is these that I discuss here. In particular, I consider which types of autonomy – 
procedural or substantive – allow us to meet the aim of properly representing the 
bomber’s autonomy in two ways: first with regards to reflecting the situation, context 
or structures of the women’s decisions; and second for reflecting degrees of 
autonomy. Following those with more substantive leanings, I argue that, for my 
example of the female bombers, procedural views are less able to factor in social 
features that frame and infuse decision-making, whilst substantive accounts are better 
at capturing these. Further I contend that substantive rather than procedural theories 
are better at plotting the degree of autonomy that might be evident for these women. 
Thus, substantive theories are to be preferred over procedural ones for reflecting how 
the bombers choose and the extent of autonomy they might have.  
 
As sometimes little is known about the bombers, when I apply theory to practice in 
this section of the chapter, I will propose possible interpretations of the women by 
using what we do know, or what we could imagine, about them. Though there could 
be other readings, I suggest these are at least plausible ways to understand them. 
Moreover, the specifics are less important for the task at hand, which is to illustrate 
how the general philosophical approaches work and the sorts of things they can 
illuminate. The particulars could be changed which would offer different details but 
the broad models and the kinds of things they reveal would remain the same.  
 
(a) Decision-making 
Relational models of autonomy all start with a relational agent – an agent that is 
socially embedded, formed within social relationships and shaped by a complex set of 
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intersecting determinants (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 4) – but can be separated into 
two camps about decision-making: either procedural or substantive.  
 
The procedural approaches take the agent to be autonomous if she reflects in the right 
kinds of ways. Diana Meyers argues, “what makes the difference between 
autonomous and heteronomous decisions is the way in which people arrive at them – 
the procedures they follow or fail to follow” (1989, 52). Marilyn Friedman contends 
an agent “might still be choosing autonomously even if she chooses subservience to 
others for its own sake, so long as she made her choice in the right way” (2003, 19). 
Andrea Westlund favours a method that is “formal rather than substantive in nature 
[which] carries with it no specific value commitments” (2009, 28). Though there are 
different ways in which to assess autonomous decision-making (such as requirements 
of competence, integration or answerability respectively), the common theme is that 
such theories focus on procedures and do not stipulate substantive choices that qualify 
as autonomous.  
 
Substantive theories, on the other hand, go beyond the decision-making process alone. 
In particular, such models appeal to the content of the desire and/or are pinned to 
external factors to some extent. A strong substantive account, for instance, could 
focus on the agent’s ability to identify and reason according to the correct standards 
and norms – or whether they track “the True and the Good” (Wolf 1990, 71). If the 
content of their desires fall short of this cognitive and normative benchmark then, 
despite passing the procedural test, they are not good candidates for being 
autonomous. Alternatively, a strong theory could advocate that certain external 
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conditions, or socio-relational properties, exist before an agent can exercise her 
autonomy (Oshana 1998). Though anything can be chosen in theory, the individual 
must be in a society that allows her to pursue her goals in social and psychological 
security, for instance (ibid, 94-5). Such conditions are relevant in allowing de facto 
rather than simply de jure autonomy, and in what is (or can be) actually chosen (ibid). 
There is some interrogation, then, of the substance of the decision and/or a 
consideration of the external factors in which the agent is immersed. In effect strong 
accounts filter out desires based on the wrong norms or those formed in autonomy-
inhibiting circumstances (Stoljar 2000, 95), ruling them out as nonautonomous.  
 
Weaker versions of substantivism advocate that if the agent possesses certain traits, 
the content of the desire itself is not automatically limited. This position is very much 
linked to the external, since holding various traits – such as self-worth, self-esteem or 
self-respect (Benson 1994; Meyers 2008; Hill 1991) – are deeply connected to social 
forces and relationships, and much more so than the ‘self’ in each of these attitudes 
implies. Paul Benson, for instance, proposes a normative-competence account (2008, 
136). Here it is the agent’s view towards herself, as contingent on her relational 
experiences (such as whether others engender a sense of self-worth in her and whether 
she holds a position of self-worth too), which is key for autonomy (rather than 
following certain norms or particular conditions transpiring).
8
 The content is still 
interrogated as an indicator of a stance towards herself and the external matters in that 
it is a strong enabler of such stances, but certain decisions can pass as autonomous 
                                                             
8 This is similar to Westlund’s (2009) later account of answerability and responsibility for the self, but 
Benson states his is a weak substantive notion of self-worth, whereas Westlund argues hers is a procedural 
account since the agent “may even manifest a lack of self-respect” (37) yet still be able to answer for herself.  
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despite their content. Whether strong or weak, these are substantive views of 
autonomy.  
Application 
Having sketched the broad approaches, the question with which I am now concerned 
is how well do these theories track features relevant to the female suicide bomber’s 
decision-making? I argue that substantive accounts fare better than procedural ones 
because they more effectively trace factors like context, relationships and structures in 
decision-making.    
 
To start, there are some clear benefits to procedural theories if we are interested in 
representing the women as having autonomy. Since the desire itself is not something 
that is limited (in principle anything can be chosen) and authentic decision-making 
revolves around what one really wants (whatever that happens to be), it seems that 
procedural approaches are likely to increase the chances of attributing autonomy to 
the bombers. And this indeed is our goal.  
 
Further, as procedural accounts embrace the fundamentally social (not atomistic or 
individualistic) self, the importance of the social for agent and autonomy is not 
discounted. Degauque, Sharipova and the unnamed bomber are acknowledged as 
social selves that could not be understood as standing apart from their present and 
historical relationships (with her brother and husbands in Degauque’s case) and 
contexts (of conflict and poverty in the examples of Sharipova and the unnamed 
bomber). This is the agent as relational. In addition, procedural accounts identify that 
autonomy (the process of self-reflection) is itself socially immersed too, and that 
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social forces are not absent from decision-making. Degauque’s decision is linked to 
her contexts such that the desire to bomb emerges from the conflict in Iraq amongst 
other factors. This is autonomy as relational.  
 
But, after these understandings of relationality, proceduralism focuses not on 
Degauque, Sharipova or the unnamed bomber’s desire to bomb, (content or conditions 
underpinning it) but on self-reflection, endorsement of desires, or autonomy skills 
(procedures). The unnamed bomber could be considered to have certain competencies 
of “self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction” (Meyers 1989, 20) for instance, 
that enable her to reflect on the decision to bomb and accept it as hers despite difficult 
circumstances. Or Sharipova might hold a disposition to answer for herself and so the 
preference to bomb could be regarded as hers, even if she is within a subordinating 
relationship (Westlund 2009). Differently, Degauque’s lower-order desires and 
higher-order principles might show a discrepancy or lack of integration – perhaps 
owing to oppressive forces – which indicates the desire is not hers (Friedman 1986). 
All of these involve some investigation into whether the desire is the bomber’s (via 
the reflective procedure) but bombing itself (the content) is not assessed, so it remains 
a viable autonomous choice.  
 
However, two related points can be raised here. First, insofar as our aim of mapping 
relevant features in the bomber’s decision-making, it is likely that the social – the 
difficult context, subordinating relationship or oppressive structures above – does play 
a significant role in what they do. The bombers act partly because of these things as 
opposed to in spite of them, and when the focus is to recognise relevant aspects of 
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how they decide, this should be part of the discussion. While relational procedural 
accounts can do some of this, substantive ones do it better. Second, allowing any 
desire to be autonomous without properly considering how the external affects the 
substance of decisions – which is the more procedural approach – limits our 
understanding of just how pervasive social factors, and critically just how relational 
agents, are in their decision-making. Substantive approaches, again, can recognise this 
better.  
 
Taking these in turn, others have made a similar argument regarding the first issue 
about the social – notably in relation to contraception and abortion decisions (Stoljar 
2000), gaslighting (Benson 1994), voluntary slaves (Oshana 2006) and desperate 
choices (Widdows 2013). In these discussions the thought was – roughly – that 
procedural views omitted a proper consideration of relationships or contexts and their 
impact on what is chosen. Here I wish to illustrate this using the bombers.  
 
If we imagine Sharipova within a situation of political conflict (in Dagestan, between 
insurgents and the Russian authorities) and in an oppressive environment that limits 
what she is expected to become as a woman (imagine an expectation to be a carer or 
teacher, for instance), then it is not difficult to suggest that these do frame her 
decisions. It is less the case that she can opt to be a banker or a doctor, which she may 
do in a less oppressive setting, or to be a pacifist, which she may do in more stable 
conditions. Even though Sharipova may go against the grain and do things that are 
unexpected of her – like becoming a bomber – the broader aspects are significant to 
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what she selects, as various theorists have argued about persons in general.
9
 Thinking 
about what is chosen and the context, relationships or structures in which it is chosen 
as a whole (a substantive view) is more likely to accurately reflect how decisions are 
made than sidelining the content altogether (a procedural view). Though it may seem 
that procedural accounts are a plausible understanding of how agents decide, and may 
seem to bestow women with agency whatever they choose, it is less helpful in 
tracking all the elements relevant to their decision-making once considered a little 
deeper.  
 
The second and connected issue is the extensiveness of the social. While procedural 
theorists accept the social self, that social factors govern the autonomy process, and 
even that decisions emerge from social contexts (as noted above), they do not wish to 
extend the assessment of autonomy to the content of decisions which themselves are 
not immune to the social. I contend that to not recognise how the substance of those 
choices is profoundly affected by one’s sociality – such that it requires some role in 
autonomy – is ultimately to downplay the relational self. To ignore the substance 
underestimates how far the social nature of self goes and so how much the content of 
decision-making is contingent on the external. The sort of self that is relational “all 
the way down” (Code 2000, 196) implies that the content of and reasons behind 
decisions themselves are likely to play a part in deciphering whether the desires are 
the agent’s own. Without factoring this in, we might miss signs of oppression – that 
                                                             
9 A broad-range of theorists – not just autonomy theorists – have argued that the context and content is 
important for decision-making. There has been much discussion, for instance, about adaptive preferences 
and how one’s preferences can change depending on what one can expect to get or to be in their 
circumstances (Nussbaum 2000). Others have criticised that – in relation to forced marriages – there is a 
failure to distinguish formal and substantive ‘exit rights’ (Okin 2002). Procedural theorists in the relational 
camp would certainly wish to acknowledge the importance of these contextual aspects, but substantive 
theorists want to go further and include this in the assessment of autonomy, as I will go on to show.  
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is, forms of interference that are due to subordinating social structures – that affect 
what is chosen.  
 
The pull of proceduralism is that it preserves plural conceptions of the good. Yet to 
exclude the content of the decision and thereby a clear look at the interrelations 
between the content and (the potentially oppressive) external contexts, relationships 
or structures misrepresents how much the social is a part of agents and obscures 
factors affecting how agents decide and importantly what they decide. On these two 
grounds, procedural accounts track relevant features of decision-making less well than 
they might. 
 
That brings us onto substantive theories. As with their procedural counterparts, these 
theories start from the relational self – a social self – and the acknowledgement that 
social factors contextualise autonomy. Unlike proceduralists, however, substantivists 
wish to include the content of or reasons behind those decisions as part of the 
assessment of autonomy, as this stays truer to the thoroughly social selves the 
bombers are (as has just been alluded to).  
 
If we return to the bomber Sharipova, for instance, if it transpires that Sharipova has 
damaged self-worth as those around her do not expect much from her (a weak 
substantive focus – Benson 1994) and this causes her to not-bomb then the content is 
considered suspect and possibly not what she wants. Alternatively, if Sharipova has 
very few meaningful options (a strong substantive view – Oshana 1998) then the 
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content of her desire to bomb might be more problematic.
10
 There is recognition, then, 
that some decisions may be more precarious given the context or relationships or 
structures – where oppressive settings lead to a reduced self-worth or an absence of 
meaningful options. Yet factoring in these features does capture how Sharipova 
decides and affects what she chooses; damaged self-worth derived in part from 
oppressive structures impacts whether autonomy-inhibiting decisions are made. In 
other words, what is decided and why, in conjunction with the contexts, relationships 
and structures in which it occurs, plays a role in reflecting the overall character of 
decision-making.  
 
While taking all this into account may result in not labelling people autonomous as 
swiftly as procedural views might allow, which at first glance seems 
counterproductive to our goal of recognising the bomber’s agency, the social and the 
content of decisions is so significant for how persons decide in substantive models 
that it must be captured in conceptions of autonomy. This is not to imply that these 
externalities make the bombers nonautonomous. Indeed clarifying this issue is the aim 
of the next section of the chapter.  
 
(b) Amounts of autonomy 
All relational theories wish to move away from conceptualising autonomy as solely 
an either/or capacity – that either one has it or does not – and toward the idea of a 
                                                             
10 Oshana’s four sufficiency conditions for autonomy are: (1) critical reflection (to determine authenticity in 
a similar way to most ‘internalists’, such as Gerald Dworkin or John Christman); (2) procedural 
independence (where this requires non-coercion or non-manipulation, but also demands certain 
substantive standards to actually meet the formality stipulation); (3) access to a range of relevant options 
(the condition is not met by having an endless supply of non-autonomous options or where the options only 
satisfy brute desires); (4) social-relational properties (the individual must be in a society that allows her to 
pursue her goals in social and psychological security) (1998, 94-5). 
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spectrum of autonomy – that one can be more or less autonomous. Here I explore how 
well the theories might recognise the extent of autonomy in these women’s decisions.  
 
In procedural accounts persons must pass a threshold after which they attain degrees 
of autonomy. On one theory, subservient decisions are less autonomous than non-
subservient ones but they are autonomous nonetheless, for example (Friedman 2003). 
An another theory, a degree-based approach could be pinned to how well someone 
exercises autonomy competency (skills of self-discovery, self-definition and self-
direction) (Meyers 1989). Here minimal, medial and full autonomy is distinguished 
and it is likely that full self-governance is rare, medial achievable by many, and 
minimal by most (ibid).
11 
These views attempt to move away from autonomy being 
there or not (the focus on competence or capacity alone) to considering the extent to 
which autonomy is exerted (the focus on exercise).   
 
Though not all explicitly state this, substantive positions also lean towards a degree-
based approach. Stronger accounts tend to emphasise that social norms are significant 
and can limit the amount of autonomy attainable because they come to impress false 
ideals on the agent. Wolf’s case of JoJo – the dictator who believes that ruling well is 
                                                             
11 Meyers’ characterisation of the levels of autonomy are: “I shall say someone is minimally autonomous 
when this person possesses at least some disposition to consult his or her self and at least some ability to 
act on his or her own beliefs, desires, and so forth, but when this person lacks some of the other skills from 
the repertory of autonomy skills, when the autonomy skills the person possesses are poorly developed and 
poorly coordinated, and when this person possesses few independent competencies that could promote the 
exercise of available autonomy skills. I shall say that someone is fully autonomous when this person 
possesses a compete repertory of well developed and well coordinated autonomy skills coupled with many 
and varied independent competencies. Medially autonomous people range along a spectrum between these 
two poles” (Meyers, 1989, 170). Meyers’s framework relates to her notions of “episodic”, “programmatic” 
and “narrowly programmatic” autonomy (1989, 48). She illustrates that in oppressive situations (such as 
feminine socialisation) high degrees of episodic autonomy can be achieved (doing what one most wants in a 
particular situation), and narrowly programmatic autonomy can be achieved (decisions on a life partner for 
instance), but programmatic autonomy (whether to marry at all or whether to be a mother) are 
compromised (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). 
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to rule cruelly (1990) – is an instance where the agent is less (though arguably, as I 
shall discuss, there is an implication that they are un-) able to be autonomous. 
Autonomy is limited when one endorses a desire that involves incorrect (different to 
‘the True and the Good’) values and fails to critically challenge them. The content of 
what is chosen, then, indicates the sorts of values held and so the amount of autonomy 
that might exist.  
 
Weaker substantive accounts focus on the extent to which oppressive norms affect 
one’s self-worth or self-esteem. Negative external circumstances – like those of the 
gaslighted woman, whose husband manipulates her to doubt her sanity so he can 
cheat her out of money – can lead to a diminished self-worth and autonomy (Benson 
1994). The situation erodes her self-worth to the extent that her competence to 
question her desires and values (say to hand over her inheritance to her husband) are 
reduced, even if she appears to readily endorse them (ibid). The degree of autonomy 
she enjoys is less than if she had a strong self-worth owing to a more conducive social 
setting. The content here is useful as a barometer of the extent of self-worth – and so 
the degree of autonomy that – the agent has.  
Application  
Having set out that relational accounts favour a degree-based notion of autonomy, the 
question now is how useful are the different interpretations for recognising how much 
autonomy the female bombers may have. I argue that when we want to make a 
judgment on the extent of autonomy, it is better to include several variables and build 
up a detailed picture of the women’s situations and decisions. Extending the earlier 
discussion, I propose that substantive theories (that factor in the content as well as 
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broader contexts while paying homage to the relational nature of the agent) are more 
apt at this task than procedural ones.   
  
When applying the procedural account, a minimal threshold (competence) and then 
degree (exercise) of autonomy can be considered. If Degauque is someone who, for 
instance, has the brute ability for self-reflection, then the extent to which she exercises 
her self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction skills is key in judging how much 
autonomy she has in her decision to bomb (Meyers 1989). One formulation is that if 
we imagine Degauque to resist, question and then agree with her former husband’s 
wish to join al-Qaeda, then she exercises her self-direction skill a great deal more than 
if she just ‘goes along’ with it (ibid, 83). This attributes some agency to Degauque 
even if we suppose she is in difficult circumstances. 
 
While a useful conception of degrees, the worry with procedural theories is that – 
following the section above – by de-emphasising substantive elements (such as 
content or attitudes towards the self) they are less able to account for just how social 
agents’ choices and decision-making are, and further just how social persons are. 
Without factoring in more substantive features, there are fewer tools for determining 
how much autonomy the bombers have. Since the focus for analysis in procedural 
accounts is the process of decision-making and not the substance of the decision 
itself, the full picture of the extent of autonomy is less easily mapped and perhaps 
even obscured in content-neutral theories. Moreover, by limiting what is assessed as 
part of autonomy, there is less of an appreciation of how social agents, including their 
autonomous abilities, are.  
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To substantiate some of this, let us take four instances of Sharipova (none of which 
involve direct interference with the decision-making process) where she is part of a 
society that:  
(1) does not advocate bombing and she decides to bomb 
(2) does not advocate bombing and she decides not to bomb 
(3) does advocate bombing and she decides to bomb; and 
(4) does advocate bombing and she decides not to bomb.  
 
This combination of broader societal factors, the decision-making, and the content of 
the decision might each tell us something slightly different about Sharipova’s 
autonomy. Instances (1) and (3) involve the content of bombing, while (2) and (4) 
involve the content of not-bombing. Instances (3) and (4) involve a society that 
encourages bombing, whereas (1) and (2) a society that discourages it. Without going 
into each combination and prescribing what is most autonomous (this is not my 
focus), I propose that it is when the content, context, relationships and structures, and 
decision-making from the relational self, are considered together that a better 
understanding of the degree of Sharipova’s autonomy is facilitated. In other words, by 
drawing on these different elements, substantive views offer an additional (and so 
potentially richer) and more accurate (owing to properly recognising the social self as 
well as more variables in autonomy), way in which to measure degrees of autonomy 
than procedural theories.  
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How well do strong substantive theories fare? In the example of Sharipova, it might 
be the case that, following a Wolfian account, there has been an accurate tracking of 
‘the True and the Good’. We can imagine that Sharipova recognises the complexities 
of the conflict in Dagestan, her role as a teacher and daughter, and what is expected of 
her. In this scenario, she is able to cognitively see the world as it is. Further, she might 
have the relevant kind of moral understanding that allows her to avoid erroneous 
judgements. She is able to decipher normative cues in the appropriate kinds of ways. 
Here, on top of minimal capacities and the internal procedures of decision-making, 
how well Sharipova aligns herself to cognitive and normative factors about the world 
(as seen by what she endorses) is an additional resource that helps us to recognise the 
amount of her autonomy.  
 
A problem here might be that a strong view does not enable some desires to be 
recorded as autonomous to some extent because they are the wrong sorts. As Benson 
has argued, strong theories can be charged with being about right-rule rather than self-
rule (2008). They can be criticised for letting nothing (or not very much) pass as 
autonomous because agents have to pick the right thing. Where we are concerned to 
identify subtleties in autonomy rather than a crude autonomous-or-not view, as is our 
purpose, this is worrying. There might be a reply here: the focus of strong accounts is 
less about choosing rightly than about there being more appropriate choices (itself a 
matter of degree). As Wolf (1990) has argued, the normative component of her view 
does not require knowing what the good is but recognising there are better or worse 
ways to be.
12
 In a parallel way, ideas about false norms could identify not the true 
                                                             
12 Responsibility on Wolf’s account depends on the freedom to appreciate the True and the Good; to discern 
cognitive beliefs and moral values about the world. Whilst she accepts this commits us to objectivity (it 
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norm but better or worse norms for agents. In this regard, what is captured on the 
spectrum with nuance is how far agents decide according to (or how far the content of 
their decisions are aligned to) better or worse norms. This might not satisfy some for 
whom it is still taking autonomy into the realm of right-rule, but this may be a way 
out of the worry that strong theories do not allow for a spectrum. 
 
How apt are weak substantive theories for measuring degrees of the female bombers’ 
autonomy? On a self-worth account, the extent of autonomy can be indicated through 
responsibility for self (Benson 2000). We could imagine that Sharipova lives in a 
context where expectations to answer for herself were in place (she is in a position of 
authority as a school teacher and has a good deal of self-worth from it, both toward 
herself and from others). Alternatively, we can suppose that Degagague who was 
encouraged to be answerable when growing up might have a reduced self-worth 
because of her subsequent experiences (from personal grief or similar) that leave her 
with little faith in herself. Though both women might be competent and self-reflective 
and may formally endorse bombing, on this picture, Degagague has less self-worth to 
answer appropriately, which affects her reflection. These distinctions allow us to 
decipher the degree of autonomy she exercises. It also evades the problem of right-
rule since the content is a useful resource for more fully gauging attitudes towards the 
self and the quality of reflection this enables and is not about picking the right thing.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
“implies the existence of nonarbitrary standards of correctness” – 1990, 124) she denies that this is as 
onerous as we might initially think, claiming there is no privileged position to determine freedom, no 
guarantee that we can or will see things aright, but equally no reason to doubt that the “powers [to do so, 
including those of logic, but also imagination and perception] are at least partly open to us.” (2008, 273) 
Thus, her position is not that there needs to be an optimal and complete set of values or that they be 
knowable from a culture-independent view, but that “the agent be capable of forming better values rather 
than worse ones, good value judgements rather than bad ones, just insofar as there are better and worse 
choices and judgments to be made.” And she goes on to say that “According to the Reason View, the 
responsible agent must be in a position that allows the reasons she has for a choice to be governed by the 
reasons there are. But if the reasons there are fail to determine a uniquely right or best choice, the agent is 
no less responsible [or, to extend it for purposes of this chapter, autonomous] an agent for that.” (1990, 
125) 
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One could counter at least one of two things here. First that a spectrum is not the point 
of autonomy at all; that what matters is whether Degagaque, Sharipova, or the 
unnamed bomber meet the minimum requirement of competence and that they satisfy 
a theory-dependent form of reflection. In other words, that we know whether they are 
autonomous or not. Second, that procedural views could include all the additional 
elements of the context or relationships or structures after this judgement about being 
autonomous or not is made. Rather than conflate being autonomous and degrees of 
autonomy, they can be distinguished. In both regards procedural theories would be 
best since – though these would not deny the importance of a spectrum – autonomy 
and degrees of autonomy are more easily separable and degrees can be deduced 
without reference to substantive content or attitudes. However, if the concern is 
genuinely to represent the autonomy of the women, as it is for this chapter and book 
(and for relational theories in general), then the more relevant question does concern 
degrees and to decipher degrees satisfactorily. In order to do this, recognising the 
depths of one’s sociality and how this extends to content and attitudes is important for 
framing how autonomous one is. Likewise, expanding what is considered as part of 
the assessment of autonomy to include content and attitudes is key. Limiting these 
components would be too austere while broadening them would be better for a more 
comprehensive picture of the amount of autonomy overall. As has been argued, 
substantive theories recognise this sociality and come equipped to examine 
substantive factors that may be more useful for measuring and thus representing 
nuances in the bombers’ autonomy than procedural theories that do not go as far on 
either of these counts. Further, a strength of the weaker over the stronger substantive 
view (if my suggested reply above is not accepted) is that it evades some of the 
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worries about right-rule (Benson 2008) and so opens up what might be considered 
partly autonomous. This is likely to be more useful for the bombers since it treads the 
difficult ground of recognising the way in which individuals are thoroughly social (so 
how the external permeates decision-making) while also leaving room for plurality of 
decisions (so that bombing might be decided upon by them and some autonomy 
attributable).  
 
Thus, the weak substantive view is well suited to representing the extent of the 
bombers’ autonomy while recognising the depths of their sociality. It can discern a 
more thorough and accurate picture of the degree of autonomy that exists for the 
female suicide bombers than procedural views. In this regard, substantive theories 
should be preferred over procedural ones when accounting for the autonomy of the 
bombers and to avoid the victim-agent binary.  
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